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Abstract 
At present, the design of chemical facility layout is always based on kinds of indicated codes, e.g. GB50160-2008 and GB50016-
2006. There are many shortcomings of these codes, such as inflexible, lacking of comprehensive safety theory and ambiguous
when applying to extra-large scale chemical plant and pilot plant. A performance-based framework was built for the safety design 
of chemical facility layout, which contains four key components: hazard identification, performance target confirmation, 
consequence assessment and defending effect evaluation. As the most important component of the framework, performance
target confirmation was analyzed in particular, and a confirmation method was proposed through matching accident scenario and 
acceptable damage level of chemical facility. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The hazard of fire and explosion accident is outstanding in chemical industry. These accidents not only destroy 
accident-facilities itself, but also ‘hit’ nearby facilities by certain “physical effect” (e.g. heat radiation or blast wave), 
and sometimes even cause so-called ‘domino effect’ (accident escalation), which can obviously extend the accident 
loss [1,2]. To avoid or decrease the occurrence of situations mentioned above, people pin their hopes on the safety 
design of plant layout, which is seemed as an “initial safety method” [3]. In China, Indicated codes are usually used 
to design the chemical plant layout because of their fixed items and numbers, which are very easy to operate.  
Among all indicated codes, Criterion of Fireproof Design of Petroleum Chemical Industry (GB 50160-2008) is the 
most widely used one. These codes do make great contributions to the safety production for Chinese chemical 
industry, but some shortcomings are found out during the long time usage. MENG [4] pointed out that inflexible, 
uncertain of safety performance and lacking of systemic safety theories are three main shortcomings of the indicated 
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codes. In addition, the applicability comes under question when these codes are used to design super-large refinery 
installation and pilot plant. Therefore, developing a design framework with clear safety performance and all-around 
effect factors consideration is very significant for plant layout safety design. In this paper, the performance-based 
idea was adopted to propose the framework, and at the same time the related theories were also studied. 
2. Safety target analysis 
2.1. Requirement of safety target conformation 
The conformation of plant layout safety target, which means the anticipant safety performance of the plant layout
to be designed, is the first and the most important step of all the design work. Criterion of Fireproof Design of 
Petroleum Chemical Industry and some other frequently-used codes are studied, and two main “safety anticipations” 
can be concluded from their items: ķ ignition source facility should be sited outside the flammable area of the 
release source;ĸ facilities should not affect each other if one of them failed and caused fires or explosion accident. 
However, they are not suitable as safety targets because of their ambiguity and inoperability. First, there are many 
accident scenarios for fire, explosion and material release, and the consequence of each scenario maybe very 
different, e.g. the flammable area of leaked gas from tiny hole is in the order of meters, but the flammable area of 
leaked gas from large hole is in the order of hundred even kilo meters. So it is meaningless to consider accident 
consequence without the clear accident scenario. Second, there are many meanings of “not affect each other”, e.g. 
“don’t cause other facilities’ domino effect” is one explanation of the “not affect each other” and “don’t cause other 
facilities’ breakdown” is another explanation. So a clear meaning of “not affect each other” is necessary for an 
operable safety target. 
a. Accident scenarios of fire, explosion and leakage 
Fire, explosion and leakage in chemical industry can be divided into many accident scenarios according to their 
behavior and the accident consequence order, and these scenarios are listed in table 1. 
Table 1 Normal accident scenarios of fire, explosion and leakage in chemical industry 
fire explosion leakage 
Pool fire 
z Unbounded pool fire appears in the 
installation area 
z Pool fire on the top of vertical tank 
when the coping of tank ruptures 
z Pool fire confined within the spill 
wall
z Storage tank disaster  ruptures ,the 
leaked liquid burst or overflow the 
spill wall, and form a large-scale 
pool fire 
Jet fire 
z Vertical jet fire that appears when 
liquefied gas tank  ruptures because 
of inner super pressure or 
surrounding heat radiation 
z Arbitrary direction jet fire, which 
always occurs on pipelines 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole 
BLEVE fire ball 
Gas explosion 
z Flammable gas/liquefied gas 
detonation 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole 
 Flammable liquid/ 
liquefied gas 
vaporizing pool  
z Flammable gas/liquefied gas 
deflagration 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole 
 Flammable liquid/ 
liquefied gas 
vaporizing pool 
Mechanical explosion 
BLEVE blast wave 
Point-Source explosion 
Confined explosion 
Toxic gas leakage 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole 
Flammable gas leakage 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole 
Flammable liquid/ liquefied gas leakage 
 Tiny leakage hole 
 Moderate leakage hole 
 Large leakage hole
 Flammable liquid/ 
liquefied gas vaporizing 
pool
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b. Classification of “not affect each other” 
Heat radiation and blast wave are two main “physical effects” that will “hit” and destroy the surrounding 
facilities. According to facility’s damage degree, the consequence can be divided into four levels: ķDomino effect. 
Facility is so severely destroyed that cause the leakage of inner dangerous materials, which will cause secondary fire 
and explosion; ĸ Functional damage. Facility is severely destroyed by heat radiation or blast wave, although do not 
cause domino effect, facility can not work normally anymore or will cause domino effect if it was forced to still 
work; Ĺ Slight damage. Facility is only slightly damaged, and do not need to repair at once or can be repaired 
online; ĺ In good condition. For each damage level, the damage description and the corresponding threshold were 
found from public literatures [4-6] and listed in table 2. These numbers can be used in the design computation. 
Table 2 Thresholds of heat radiation and blast wave for different level 
Heat radiation Blast wave 
Facility damage 
level Damage description heat flux threshold, kW/m2 Damage description overpressure  threshold,105Pa
Domino effect 
Cause facilities with 
dangerous material 
secondary fire or 
explosion 
15-40 
Cause facilities with dangerous 
material secondary fire or 
explosion 
0.16-0.31 
Functional damage 
The steel bearing 
structure reach critical 
temperature  
4
0
1001000
2 ¹¸
·
©¨
§
=
criticalTCQ
No frame and self-confined steel 
construction entirely destroyed; 
tank ruptures 
0.207 
Slight damage Glass rupture 4 House walls and roof partly collapse 0.138 
In good condition -- <4 
The severe damage probability 
of house is less than 0.05; 10% 
window glass will rupture. 
<0.02 
When designing the position of facility with high human density, toxic leakage accident should be considered. 
The accident can be divided into three levels according to people’s injury degree: ķ people may die or severely 
injury because of the high toxic concentration and short escape time; ĸ the toxic concentration is not very high, and 
people have enough time to escape from the dangerous area; Ĺthe toxic concentration is very low, people would not 
injury even if they do not leave. Probit function [6], which can be expressed as formula (1), integrates the toxic 
concentration and contact time as compute parameters to estimate the dead probability. It can be used to confirm the 
corresponding concentration thresholds for each injury level. 
(1) )(lnPr tCBA n×+=
2.2. Safety target conformation analysis 
In 2.1, the requirement of safety target conformation was studied. Typical accident scenarios, damage 
descriptions of different “accident affection” levels and their corresponding thresholds were concluded. A 
reasonable accident scenario and an acceptable damage level can be combined to form an operable safety target for a 
facility. The ideal combination is “accident scenario with most serious consequence (e.g. the detonation caused by 
large leakage hole) + the lowest damage level (e.g. facility is in good condition)”, which means “facilities around 
the accident source keep in good condition even when the worst accident scenario happens”. This safety target is 
utopian because the plant layout is not only affected by safety issues, but also affected by issues on technics, 
material transportation, economic and etc. So the conformation of safety target often needs to make some concession 
because of issues mentioned above, and these concessions have close relations with the plant layout level. There are 
three levels of plant layout design, and they are respectively factory siting design, unit layout design in one factory 
and device layout design in one unit [3]. The reasonable safety target conformation for each level was analyzed below. 
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a. Device layout design 
Because of the multifarious  material interaction, requirement of quick reaction, energy complex utilization, 
devices in one unit always have to place compactly. In Criterion of Fireproof Design of Petroleum Chemical 
Industry (GB 50160-2008), the required distances between devices in the same unit are mostly less than 20m, and 
the largest number is 30m. Against this backdrop, it is not realistic to define a strict safety target.  
Through sample computation, literature [7] pointed out that some destructive accident scenarios were not 
appropriate to be considered in this level because of their too large affection area, e.g. jet fire or gas explosion 
caused by large leakage hole. With the same reason, the “anticipate acceptable facility damage level” can not be too 
strict. Devices in the same unit always have close connections with each other. If one device were seriously 
damaged and can not work anymore, other devices in the same unit often have to stop. So when accident happens, 
“no domino effect happens” looks acceptable and reasonable as surrounding devices’ “anticipate acceptable facility 
damage level” without regard to economic issues. From the analysis above, we know that reasonable safety target 
for this level is “when accident scenarios with small or moderate affection area (e.g. arbitrary direction jet fire 
caused by tiny or moderate leakage hole) happen, no domino effect happens around the accident source”. 
b. Unit layout design 
The material interaction and technics relationship between units are usually not very complex. So when design 
the unit layout, safety issues can be considered more. Comparing with the device layout design, more serious 
accident scenarios can be considered in this level, e.g. pool fire confined within the spill wall. But destructive 
accident scenarios were not appropriate to considered neither because their affection area are still large for this level. 
Domino effect is of course not accepted, furthermore, as functional independent production block, unit is not 
expected to have to stop due to other unit’s accident. So “no functional damage” is the lowest limit of surrounding 
units’ “anticipate acceptable facility damage level”. The reasonable safety target for this level can be concluded as 
“when accident scenarios with moderate affection area happens,  no functional damage happens around the accident 
source”.
c. Factory siting design 
As independent legal subject, factory and surrounding facilities can not take obvious risk from each other. So 
“the worst accident scenarios” and “the strictest anticipate acceptable facility damage level” should be considered in 
this level, in other word, the reasonable safety target is “when the most serious accident scenario happens, only 
slight damage can be accepted for facilities surrounding the accident source”. 
One thing must be stated is that each level’s “reasonable” safety target confirmed above is defined on the basis of 
current science and technology. They can be defined more strictly when new technology or effective protective 
measures were introduced. For facilities with high people density, high property density and very important facilities, 
safety target also should be stricter. The principle of safety target conformation should be “if it is acceptable for 
technics and economic issues, the stricter, the better”.  
3.  Performance-based design framework 
By analyzing the design process of the plant layout, a performance-based plant layout safety design framework is 
developed as figure 1. 
Detailed steps can be described as follows: 
(1) Carry out “hazard identification” on the basis of technics to identify every facility’s possible accidents 
scenarios, which is the input information of “accident strength evaluation” as well as chemical technics; 
(2) Carry out “accident strength evaluation” to get every facilities’ accident strength; 
(3) Confirm every facility’s safety target on the basis of the information of facility weightiness, property density, 
people density and current layout level by “safety target conformation”; 
(4) Evaluate every facility’s protective measures’ defending effects by “defending effect evaluation”; 
(5) Combine the accident strength, the safety targets and the defending effects of all facilities to estimate critical 
distances between every two facilities. 
(6) Design the layout drawing with the safety distance information and other layout design principles.
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Fig.1. Performance-based design framework of chemical plant layout 
4.  Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, A performance-based framework is built for the safety design of chemical facility layout, which 
contains four key components: hazard identification, performance target confirmation, consequence assessment and 
defending effect evaluation. As the most important component of the framework, performance target confirmation 
was analyzed in particular, and a method was proposed for it through matching accident scenario and acceptable 
damage level of chemical facility. However, the performance-based safety design theory of chemical plant layout is 
still a tentative theory, there are many difficulties should be conquered, such as the following 3 points. 
(1) Usually, there are many facilities in the plant layout design, how to quickly and correctly identify the possible 
accident scenarios for every facility?  
(2) Near-field harm should be considered in plant layout design, most accident consequence models used now are 
not appropriate for near-field harm evaluating because of the low precision. A further study should be done. 
(3) At present, defending effect theory of protective measures is not systematic, and a further study should be 
done. 
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